Rhetorical Spaces in Memorial Places:  
The Cemetery as a Rhetorical Memory Place/Space

ABSTRACT: Focusing on a seacoast New Hampshire African American burying ground and the grave of a white woman buried in a Massachusetts rural cemetery, this article considers how the essential nature of the cemetery makes it both a very usual and unusual memory place. Considering de Certeau’s distinctions between space and place as well as Foucault’s definition of a heterotopia, this paper argues that the paradoxes of the heterotopia combined with the symbolism and materiality of the grave make the cemetery a particularly potent lieu de mémoire for those otherwise forgotten in public memory.

One recent autumn morning in the affluent seacoast town of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, construction workers were busy replacing century old pipes in a $15 million urban upgrade when they made a discovery: the remains of a series of ancient coffins eight feet below the ground. The discovery was not totally unexpected. Local historians knew that maps indicated a “African Burying Ground” had been in the vicinity of Chestnut Street and that stories existed of early twentieth century construction workers uncovering skulls in an upgrade 100 years earlier (Cunningham et al), but the unearthing of actual “documentary evidence” of this burial ground was cause for surprise.

In the time since this discovery, the city has realized the 13 discovered coffins are most likely only a few of the many buried beneath city roads and buildings. The city has also grappled with what to do with these remains as the bones and coffins reveal pieces of history that many want to celebrate while others, priding themselves on their town’s democratic history, might be reluctant to embrace.

Focusing on this recently discovered African Burying Ground as well as the grave of a white woman buried in an upscale Massachusetts rural cemetery, this paper considers how the essential nature of the cemetery makes it both a very usual and unusual memory place. As a physical place and a spiritual space, the cemetery confuses the symbolic and physical to allow memories forgotten in other locations to survive—often silently. In the following sections,
this paper first briefly overviews the connections among rhetoric, memory and place, focusing on Michel Foucault’s definition of a heterotopian space and Michel de Certeau’s distinctions between space and place. The second section considers how the cemetery is able to act as a public rhetorical space for those excluded from most other public rhetorical spaces, in particular women. Building on this idea of the cemetery as an inclusive rhetorical space, the third section considers how those even more marginalized, such as eighteenth century African Americans, could find a rhetorical space in the cemetery because of its constant confusion of space and place. The final section concludes that the cemetery is both unique and ordinary, and it is this paradox, the essence of a heterotopia, that makes the cemetery a particularly important rhetorical memory space.

I. Rhetorical Memory Spaces

The connections among memory, space and rhetoric go back centuries. As the fourth canon of rhetoric, memory has been tied to rhetoric since the beginnings of both as an art. And the connections between both and physical space have existed just as long. The beginnings of “ars memoria” supposedly go back to the ancient Greek Simonides who remembered every person attending a banquet by recalling exactly where each person sat.2 The ties between memory and space continued in the classical treatise on memory, Rhetorica Ad Herrenium, which explained that to remember ideas or things, one should visualize them in a specific location in an imagined place ([Cicero]).

The ties between memory and space have also been important in the twentieth century as historians have realized the importance of materiality on memory. For example, many theorists have observed the impact of physical statues and memorials on public memory (e.g., Cohen, Driggs et al., Jacobs, Levinson, Middleton, Savage, Schwartz). Similarly, other scholars have shown how material forms of memory control behavior (e.g., Bennett, S.M. Pearce). The most important work in this area is probably that of Pierra Nora who has shown how les lieux de mémoire, memory places, are where memory “crystallizes and secretes itself” (“Between” 7). Existing at the point of a particular historical moment, this place comes to be the concrete realization of the abstract memory. This point of crystallization and secretion is separated from the moment that is remembered, and the place comes to represent it.

Relationships between memory and rhetoric have also become increasingly studied in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. For example, Kendall Phillips writes that “[t]he ways memories attain meaning, compel others to accept them, and are themselves contested, subverted, and supplanted by other memories are essentially rhetorical” (2-3). Numerous rhetoricians have also considered how rhetorical space is created and how it includes and excludes certain discourse, and certain speakers. For example, Nan Johnson
has explored how spaces, both literal and figurative, of rhetorical power were constructed in the nineteenth century to carefully exclude women. Johnson’s work shows how rhetorical guides, handbooks and other pedagogies created a cultural program that worked to control its boundaries and rules regarding who could occupy what space. Women were allocated a domestic rhetorical space, men all other. Women, then, who did speak in public worked to reassure their audiences that they were well within the correct rhetorical space, communicating that they were merely wives and mothers engaged in “domestic acts of moral intervention” (153).³

Jerry Blitefield, too, has developed the idea of rhetorical space. Connecting rhetorical space to the concept of kairos, Blitefield has noted how place has bearing on the audience’s willingness to recognize and act on a problem. Not only must a rhetor choose the appropriate moment, but s/he must choose the appropriate place. Thus, delivery is not just about “timeless abstractions of gesture and voice”; it is about “the ability to deliver the rhetorical goods” (143), making sure the rhetorical act fits within the “boundaries of that place” (144).

Lorraine Code’s work with rhetorical space also focuses on the possibilities of rhetoric in a space; however, Code sees the possibilities as being very limited. With spaces as “fictive” locations, the “territorial imperatives structure and limit the kind of utterances that can be voiced within them with a reasonable…expectation of being heard, understood, taken seriously” (ix-x). In other words, not everything can be said everywhere. Code observes how some truths are granted legitimacy in some places and considered illegitimate in others. Using the example of the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas controversy, she shows that even the most compelling truths can fail to gain assent when the available rhetorical spaces are either closed against them, or so constrained in the possibilities they offer that what is ‘really’ being said is slotted automatically into categories, ready-made pieces, where the fit is at best crude, at worst distorting and damaging (61).

Rhetorical space, then, can deny truths by translating the truth’s discourse into something more appropriate to the rhetorical space. Thus, in creating rhetoric, a rhetor must consider where the discourse is delivered as much as s/he must consider any other element of invention. Without the proper rhetorical space, all discourse can be moot.

**The Cemetery as Heterotopian Space/Place**

Though the cemetery is not often considered a rhetorical space, it certainly is known as a sacred space that contains many memories. But unlike many other sacred spaces that battle for their establishment, the cemetery is a very usual sacred space. One can expect to find a cemetery close to most any
town or village, and vice versa; the cemetery is the center of the living and the dead (Ragon 39-41, Warner, Wordsworth 56). After all, human beings die and their material bodies must be disposed of and—though there are numerous means of taking care of dead bodies—burial of the body in land is one dominant means, as it has been in many cultures for centuries upon centuries. Still, even as a usual sacred space, cemeteries contain many characteristics of other less usual sacred spaces. For example, as David Chidester and Edward Linenthal argue, sacred space produces meaning; such spaces are places where power relations are both reinforced and resisted (16). Sacred space is, according to Chidester and Linenthal, a heterotopia, a place that represents, contests, and inverts.

In his creation of the term heterotopia, Michel Foucault agrees that the cemetery is such a space. Seeing it as a space that is “connected with all the sites of the city-state or society, or village” and one that “[i]n Western culture…has practically always existed” (25), the heterotopia is able to juxtapose, in a single space, several spaces “that are in themselves incompatible” (25). In other words, in the heterotopia “all other real sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted” (24). According to Foucault, unlike the utopia that is unreal, the heterotopia is very real yet—like the utopia—it reflects fantasy. Just as one can hold a very real, physical mirror in hand while looking at the very unreal image in the physical mirror, the heterotopia is real and not real: the physical heterotopia reflects an idealization of society.

This understanding of the heterotopia as real and unreal is very reminiscent to Michel de Certeau’s definitions of the material space (lieu) and the symbolic place (espace). Like the physical mirror, lieu is real but, like the reflection, the espace exists only in one’s mind. Place (lieu) excludes two things from being in one location simultaneously; it is an “indication of stability” (117-118). Space (espace), on the other hand, is not a physical reality. It is created by operations and rules; it is a “practiced place.” Like the mirror, place is the physicality; like the image, space is not. Anyone who has tried to undo a knot or attach a necklace in the mirror knows that the mirror constantly confuses us as to what is and what is just an illusion. Similarly, the distinction between places and spaces is continually confused. Adding to our confusion is the fact that, as de Certeau points out, that places can become spaces just as spaces can become places.

Like the magician who adds to our befuddlement when we think the mirrors’ reflections are real, the heterotopian cemetery constantly confuses space- and place-ness, confuses what is and is not. The cemetery is, as Nora terms it, lieu: it is a material site. At the same time it is, as Foucault terms it, espace: it is the creation of practices that Foucault describes.

As a space that is seen as unreal, the cemetery is allowed to exist because it is perceived as not really existing. When bodies are covered over and they
as well as their headstones decay, the cemetery will appear to be as if it never existed. Yet the cemetery did exist—and may continue to exist even after it seems not to. The cemetery’s very real graves leave the possibility of being rediscovered even after they are forgotten.

With this rediscovery, then, the place allows the space to survive. A memory can be saved. Yet, unlike the physicality of the cemetery, the saved memory is not real and is therefore open to numerous interpretations. What may have been used to instill the order of a past society could, when interpreted in a new time, undermine. For example, although the rural cemetery was to instill moral lessons, sometimes the cemetery promoted anything but morality, becoming “favored trysting places” or locations for bootleggers to store their supplies (Linden-Ward 317; Rotundo, “Monumental,” 284). The cemetery’s memory is like the mirror and its reflection: real because of the physicality of the grave yet unreal and easy to distort. Finally, as a heterotopia, the cemetery is connected to all spaces and places, allowing all in as it also juxtaposes all.

II. Inappropriate Rhetorical Memory Spaces

The discourse on public memory recognizes the importance of both physical place and symbolic space. Just as the author of Rhetorica Ad Herrinium knew when he wrote of the need to create visual places for memories, what is remembered is directly connected to where it is remembered. A memory must have a place where a memory can crystallize and secrete itself; it must deliver the rhetorical goods.

If, however, there is no public place into whose boundaries a rhetorical memory space is deemed appropriate, then the memory, like the discourse that Code describes, can disappear. This need for such rhetorical memory space explains why so many groups mobilize to ensure that their memories gain legitimacy. Monuments are an important space where groups can define themselves and “speak to or for the larger collective,” both for the present and much of the future (Savage 6).

While numerous ethnic, religious, and interest groups have sought to create and have succeeded in creating memorials in order to have such a rhetorical memory space, women’s groups have been far less successful. There are few public memory spaces created before the twentieth century where women are remembered. While most people have private memory places of their mothers and grandmothers in family albums and perhaps in family heirlooms, few public memorials exist to help us collectively remember women.

Using Johnson’s and Code’s analyses of rhetorical space to understand these exclusions, we can see that the public has been perceived as a space where women should not be; therefore, their memorials would not fit within the boundaries of public places. When such memorials do appear in public, (to paraphrase Code’s words) the imperatives of their space limit their
expectations of being heard or taken seriously. Two examples of women’s possession of rhetorical space being silenced or not taken seriously can be found in Adelaide Johnson’s statue “The Women’s Movement” and the bust of Susan B. Anthony on Mount Rushmore.

In 1997, Johnson’s statue portraying Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and Lucretia Mott was moved from the Crypt of the United States Capitol to the Capitol’s Rotunda, over 75 years after it had been commissioned by the National Women’s Party to remember these women’s influence in passing the Nineteenth Amendment. Though it was initially placed in the prominent Rotunda, the statue was relocated to the Crypt two days after its dedication. Though many American women complained of the statue’s status from the 1930s to the 1990s, it remained in the silent Crypt. And though the Crypt was open to the public in 1963, the statue and its memory remained silent with the statue’s name changed to ‘The Portrait Monument’ and the three women unidentified. The statue was finally moved to a prominent location only after after women’s organizations and legislators vehemently complained in the 1990s about the status of the memorial and after countless reasons regarding its heaviness and ugliness were given and countered.7

And of course, there is no bust of Susan B. Anthony on Mount Rushmore despite Rose Arnold Powell’s relentless campaigning for such a memorial. Though Powell, a contemporary of Adelaide Johnson’s, argued from 1933 to her death in 1960 that Anthony had done as much for the United States as had the four men on the mountain, the idea that a woman such as Anthony deserved a place on the mountain seemed (and still seems) ridiculous to many; after all why would a memory to a woman on a mountain be taken seriously?8

However, in Lowell, Massachusetts, there is a memorial to a real woman who, during her life, received much less public attention than did Anthony, Stanton or Mott, and this memorial—in the century of its existence—has received enormous public attention. The grave to Louisa Maria Wells, known as the Mill Girl Monument, is the site of many a pilgrimage and has become a sort of tourist attraction. When it was erected in 1906, local newspapers ran detailed stories on its history, and over the years Wells’ presence has grown. For example, the Lowell Sun reported in 1928 that “scores of visiting tourists inquire of the ‘Mill Girl Monument.’” With a photo of the memorial on the cover of a book on the Lowell Cemetery, the grave continues to draw people and is an additional destination of tourists who visit the Lowell mills museums.

Because the cemetery is perceived as a symbolic space representing ideals consistent with femininity, the memorial to Louisa Wells is in an appropriate space. However, because the cemetery is a heterotopia—representing, contesting, and inverting—it can convey messages that contradict the norms of femininity. In the cemetery, individual women—who achieved “nothing” other than raising their families, building homes, doing daily chores, and helping
to build a country—are remembered while they are forgotten in all other public memory spaces. Like the parlor that granted women’s discourse legitimacy, the cemetery delivers the rhetorical goods, singing praises to many people, including women of all races and classes. The cemetery is not a rhetorical space closed to the memory of women. Such memory can be taken seriously.

_Louisa Wells’ Heterotopian Space_

Louisa Wells was not a woman of unusual achievement; she worked in a Lowell mill as a weaver. She never married and lived much of her life with her mother. Her largest contribution to conventional United States history is that she may have sewed uniforms for Union Soldiers. Yet in the twenty-first century, she is remembered for her contributions to the United States, and she represents many other very ordinary women like her who are not remembered in rhetorical spaces.

When Wells died, her will stated that her estate should be used to erect a memorial on her grave in Lowell Rural Cemetery, a cemetery modeled after the prestigious Mount Auburn (Goodwin 26). Legally contested by her family, this directive finally won out after twenty years of litigation, perhaps because the request was not seen as particularly unusual, perhaps because Irish tradition valued a good burial, perhaps because the patriarchal committee saw it as reflecting the norms of society.¹

By the time this decision was passed down, Wells’ original modest sum had evolved into a considerable one. So great, in fact, was this financing for the memorial that Daniel Chester French was commissioned to create the grave. Perhaps thinking a grave for a woman such as Wells unimportant, French gave the commission to one of his protégée, Evelyn Longman, who sculpted a memorial depicting an Angel soothing a worn woman who holds a mill bobbin by her side. The memorial’s epitaph reads: “Out of the fibre of her daily tasks/ she wove the fabric of a useful life/ Louisa Maria Wells/ Died February 20 1886.”¹⁰

Wells seems to have known the importance of commemoration, and she wanted to be remembered. Wells did not have wealthy friends to create a rhetorical memory space in a prestigious cemetery. Instead, Wells herself—perhaps recognizing how the tombstones influenced the realities of mill workers who walked to the rural Lowell cemetery on their days off—planned to have herself remembered. Others thought the price of commemoration too steep; a woman such as she did not deserve such memory. While arguments might have been used to keep memorials to women from public places outside the cemetery, this space already represented women, and an unusually elaborate one fit within the societal understanding of the feminine. Yet as a heterotopia, this space could turn this societal understanding on its head.
Appropriate Rhetorical Memory Space

But what is it about the cemetery that makes it a rhetorical space that makes it fit within the societal understanding of the feminine? One explanation could be that cemeteries appear very feminine. Unlike those that segregate by race, religion, and class, few cemeteries are exclusive to one gender; bodies of dead women need to be disposed of as much as do bodies of dead men. 11

But more importantly, in much of American history, mourning has been considered feminine. In the nineteenth century, funeral art became a very popular means for women to express grief for themselves and others. Taught in many women’s schools and seminaries, this art took the form of needlework, painting, china, and jewelry. 12 Domesticating mourning, this art confused the cemetery memorial with the parlor memorial—and made memorializing an art very appropriate to women.

Additionally, cemeteries seem not very important sites. They are everywhere. While some might state that public monuments “stand simply as figures of forgetting, their meaning and original purpose eroded by the passage of time” (Huyssen 249), the cemetery marker seems even more indistinguishable. They are unlike the public monument in that they are erected without public consent and for a private need. And the private need is more quickly forgotten than is the need shared by the community. This lack of power seems evident when looking at these cemeteries long overgrown and forgotten, and many of these forgotten cemeteries are lost to parking lots and fast food restaurants. 13 The individual memorial seems even less important considering the proliferation of cemeteries. If, as Carole Blair and Neil Michel observe, the significance of memorials is diminished when there are multiple memorials (36), then the cemetery marker has little significance at all with so many markers in each of so many cemeteries.

The perceived inferiority of the cemetery is illustrated in nineteenth-century discussions regarding the need for public monuments. In a speech arguing for the need for public Confederate monuments in the post-bellum South, one Southern orator acknowledged the existence of such monuments in Southern cemeteries, but stated that these were insufficient. The Confederate dead, he asserted, “deserve[d] to be perpetuated otherwise than by such memorial marbles as [by] private affection may exist” (Bishir 10). Similarly, potential patrons of Mount Auburn Cemetery in Cambridge, Massachusetts refused to “wast[e] good money on statues that no one would ever see” (Rotundo, “Mount Auburn” 274). Approaching the insignificance of cemetery memorials differently in his discussion of commemoration, Edward Casey refers to great literary authority to show the powerlessness of cemeteries: “only the sun—marks Wordsworth—reads the epitaphs on gravestones” (227).

Cemeteries also appear to be quiet resting places that are very stable. Not much seems to happen in cemeteries, and what little does seems to be
closely regulated. In her treatise on the American way of death, Jessica Mitford notes the great control cemetery corporations have over their land and what happens there. With this control, nothing erratic seems permitted. The space appears to be the most stable of places. We can see evidence of this apparent stability in Jacob Bigelow’s early history of Mount Auburn, which shows the careful control the founders of America’s first rural cemetery had over their land as they met to contemplate sites, names, layout, size of lots, price of lots, drainage, gardens, subscriptions and accounts for their endeavor.

The stability of this space seems not only controlled by the rural cemetery corporations, but by the visitors themselves. These cemeteries were and are beautiful gardens. They were structured for people to walk through, look at and internalize. One important goal of these cemeteries was for visitors to go and contemplate life and death, to see the beauty of order, and to emulate this order. As Joseph Story stated in his 1831 Address at the dedication of Mt. Auburn, the cemetery is for the living “that the repositories of the dead bring home thoughts of admonition, of instruction” (qtd Bigalow 148). Guidebooks to Mount Auburn echo this idea, stressing the moral lessons of the cemeteries (Linden-Ward 304).

To ensure that people did emulate the order, these cemeteries reminded visitors that they were seen. Mount Auburn’s focal point is a tower, from which serves a double function of landmark and “observatory commanding an uninterrupted view of the country around it . . . from its summit, a magnificent and unbroken panorama . . . will be spread out beneath the eye” (Bigalow 16-17). And with this panopticon, the Mount Auburn Tower makes clear to visitors to the cemetery that they both see and are seen, transforming the public’s behavior via imitation and surveillance.14

While other types of cemeteries do not have the same Foucaultian system of surveillance as deeply entrenched as does the rural cemetery, the system is there. Wordsworth notes that the epitaph is a “pious admonition to the living,” and the gravemarker thus warns the living to watch their behavior. For example, an epitaph in an eighteenth to nineteenth century Portsmouth, New Hampshire graveyard praises Anna Halliburton, stating that she “Liv’d here belov’d as friend, as mother—wife,” but it then goes on to warn the reader to take lessons from Halliburton: “Reader! Would’st thou be happy here? be blest on high/ Then learn like her to live—like her to die” (Tallman). Even the seemingly entirely powerless potter’s field—where bodies are thrown, unmarked and unremembered—involves Foucaultian power relations; mere knowledge of these graves’ existence makes people long to participate in the norms of society in order to avoid such unremarkable site for their ending.

Whatever the form of stabilization, cemeteries seem to be places that never offer contestation. Unlike American town squares where orators offer competing opinions under the gaze of public monuments proclaiming public
affection, cemeteries seem not to be a space for contestation. After all, the only form of rhetoric seeming to exist in the cemetery is that which no one but the sun seems to read: the epitaph. Requiring names and dates, cemetery monuments to millions of humans are remarkably similar, and they certainly don’t seem very influential, especially if they are unread.

With cemeteries so stable and quiet, they seem to fit Ralf Dahrendorf’s definition of a utopia: stable in both time and space, maintaining uniformity, possessing a universal consensus, and having clear boundaries. With corpses unlikely to contest their community, the cemetery’s consensus seems evident. And with a barrage of monuments celebrating men, women mostly remembered as “wife of,” and the private corporations composed of men founding and governing most cemeteries, the cemetery is perhaps a patriarchal utopia. As such, cultural forces do not need to give it great heed.

**Representation and Inversion**

Of course, the cemetery is not so much the utopia as the heterotopia, as Michel Foucault suggests. Like the idealized utopia, the heterotopian space is connected with all other spaces; however, unlike the utopia, it inverts. It is what it seems not to be. When Dahrendorf notes that the only “difference between utopia and a cemetery is that occasionally some things do happen in utopia” (109-110), he overlooks—as do most people of our culture—that much happens in a cemetery. It is this oversight combined with the cemetery’s very activity that make it a powerful location for forgotten memory.

Cemeteries seem silent, yet cemeteries are as silent as they are not. If one sees cemeteries as a rhetorical space, then there are thousands upon thousands of voices clamoring to be heard, a cacophony of remembrances are calling out. In fact, the *Oxford English Dictionary* notes that the word “commemoration” implies a calling, reaching out to persuade the listener to join in with the commemoration. Yet rhetors of epitaphs do not have the same possibilities of censure that other rhetors face. For one thing, the narrator of the memorial texts is rarely known. With a few exceptions, commemorations and epitaphs remember the dead, but give no credit, or blame, to the author of the text. Therefore, if the values celebrated are pushing the boundaries that are patrolled, the author of the discourse escapes censure. With these many voices calling out, the “cemetery provides a kind of postmodern history. A true bricolage” (Wright 33). And in this bricolage, women’s voices find their way to audiences that might otherwise never hear them. In addition, the genre of the epitaph adds to the mistaken sense that the cemetery is constant. Although this genre seems to require a name and date of death, there are innumerable variations to this genre. In his essays on the epitaph, William Wordsworth argues that the epitaph must be truth “hallowed by love” (57), and it can range
from description of the deceased’s merits to a mere statement of birth and death dates.\textsuperscript{16}

In addition, women’s voices in the cemetery benefit from a confusion of public and private. Although they are accumulated expressions of “private affection,” many American cemeteries are public spaces, in that they are open to the public to wander through. Nevertheless, they are not public; one must buy the burial plot as a kind of real estate. Plots in prestigious rural cemeteries were expensive and inaccessible to many who want to commemorate their dead, yet they were and still are celebrated as accessible public parks in which people can stroll and contemplate life and death.

The fact that the memorial is a private expression that is open for all to see is extremely important to the cemetery. As a form of private expression, the cemetery memorial does not have to go through the complex stages of development that public ones do. The lengthy process of creating a public monument involves the creation of the idea, formation of a committee to see the idea through, fundraising, site selection, design and sculptor selection, production and dedication (Driggs et al. 37). While many public monuments are doomed because they cannot gain public consensus on many of the elements of this process,\textsuperscript{17} cemetery monuments need far less approval, even with the close monitoring of the cemetery officials.

This shortcut in the process of approval makes cemetery monuments closer to what Kirk Savage calls vernacular “folk” memory than are other public monuments (7). Savage argues that because of the process of negotiation that a public memory place must go through, a memory, once it turns public becomes “altogether different structurally” from the folk memory. In this process of making memory public, some groups have more control than others, so some get fewer of their memories preserved than do others. However, since the cemetery monument expresses private feelings, it does not demand this complex process, and this shortcut of development allows cemetery monuments to be very similar structurally to folk memory. While, as Savage points out, most public memory spaces are “a composite creation of many different groups and voices acting and reacting in relation to one another,” the cemetery as a bricolage is itself such a composite creation, yet the monument can be this “folk” memory, similar to, but longer lasting than, the quilts and tales mentioned by Savage.

Another, perhaps more important, reason this confusion of private and public adds to the cemetery’s potency is that this confusion helps allow the cemetery’s existence. As private memories, close to “folk” memories, the individual grave seems unimportant, almost ignored, read only by the sun, as Edward Casey paraphrases Wordsworth. Yet this common perception of the graveyard is a misperception that helps allow for the graveyard to be a rhetorical memory site for the disenfranchised.
The common error of this perception is illustrated with Casey’s paraphrase; this esteemed scholar seems to misread Wordsworth, as many people misread the significance of the graveyard. In Part One of his “Essay on Epitaphs,” Wordsworth states what Casey paraphrases: that “in the churchyard it [an epitaph] is open to the day; the sun looks down upon the stone, and the rains of heaven beat against it” (59). Yet Wordsworth offers these words in support of a claim made earlier in the same sentence that the individual grave is important, because it is read and remembered by a catalogue of many different people: “it is exposed to all—to the wise and the most ignorant…the stooping old man cons the engraven record like a second hornbook;—the child is proud that he can read it; and the stranger is introduced through its mediation to the company of a friend.”

**Wells’ Representation and Inversion**

The committee that allowed Wells’ funds to be used for her glorious monument most likely did not realize how many people would come to see it, how many of the wise and ignorant would be exposed to it, how many would use it as a second hornbook to learn an alternative history of the country. Additionally, this committee probably did not imagine that this memorial’s female angel and her comforting touch on the tired mill girl could ever contest the understandings of women as nurturers, religious devotees, and frail beings. However, in many ways it does.

Longman’s brilliant memorial is a fifteen-foot high relief panel with just two figures. Like most cemetery angels of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the angel is a female figure. She stands and is just about to touch another female figure seated on what appears to be a stone. These two female figures seem the idealized women of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; their heads are bowed, their eyes cast down. With her long flowing hair that mels with the waves of her garment, the angel seems about to enfold the mortal woman in her wings. The weary mortal woman—her head resting on her left hand and wrist, her hair tied behind her head so as not to get in the way of this woman’s work—seems too tired to notice the loving embrace of the immortal being. The sculpture seems very much in the genre of feminine funeral art, idealizing and safe. It seems to instill Foucaultian surveillance on its viewer, encouraging other women to adopt this passive ideal.

Its reflection of the genre of appropriate cemetery statuary can be seen in its similarity to French’s 1891 memorial to Martin Millimore, “The Angel of Death and the Sculptor.” This similarity also seemed to make Longman’s sculpture, created by a woman for a woman, even more appropriate. Longman was imitating her mentor, making changes to the sculpture to make it more appropriate for a woman’s memorial. Instead of the angel reaching out to an active artist, as in French’s sculpture, Longman’s angel reaches down to
a passive being. French’s mortal is actively engaged in sculpting; Longman’s is seated and worn. Longman’s angel seems to comfort the mortal; French’s angel’s expression seems more ambivalent. Yet this allusion also inverts. By making a connection between an American sculptor like Millmore and an unknown factory worker like Wells, this memorial makes an equation rarely seen elsewhere in public commemoration. In both monuments, the mortals hold the tools of their craft: French’s the chisel and stone of a sculptor and Longman’s the bobbin and thread of a weaver. Representing the ideal woman, this memorial contests the patriarchy, suggesting that Wells’ work was as important as Millmore’s and that Wells deserves public memory as much as does Millmore. Longman’s symbolic space also inverts the patriarchal utopia by reminding its viewers of the history of women’s labor in the mills, suggesting the difficulties these women suffered as they worked, as well as reminding audiences of women’s roles in the development of industrialization. While Longman and Wells may or may not have intended this inversion, the memorial does invert.19

Certainly this rhetorical memory space is not explicit with this contestation. Because memorials tend to be ambiguous, tend to have a “horizon of meaning” (Foss, Lefebvre 222), a rhetorical memory space such as Wells’ cannot be condemned. For example, though the memorial may have been permitted to exist because it seemed to offer a Foucaultian system of surveillance, not all audiences may have interpreted it as such. A Lowell paper interpreted the memorial as showing that “the peaceful end of a life of hard work is not a sad thing” and that the memorial “beckons to the appreciative and asks a gaze of sympathy and a mind of thought for the womanhood who came from every quarter of New England to contribute to an era of textile prosperity and establish the foundation of the Lowell of today.”20 On one hand, this interpretation of the memorial seems to promote self-surveillance, suggesting women emulate Wells and lead productive, happy lives and deaths while supporting societal success. On the other hand, this interpretation and the fact that this memorial has become known as the “Mill Girl Monument” suggest that the memorial reminds its audience of the price women paid in their integral role creating industrial society.21

III. An Appropriate S/p[I]ace

While white women have been excluded from many rhetorical memory spaces, African Americans of both genders have fared much worse. Although white women have been represented abstractly throughout American history as Lady Liberty, Justice or Freedom, there were no known images of African Americans in marble or bronze in America before 1860 (Savage 16, 70). It was almost as if the entire African race was excluded from American collective memory. While Henry Louis Gates argues that this exclusion existed because
the image of the negro forced caucasian Americans to face their deepest fears (xxv), Kirk Savage states that slaves, hence African Americans, “could hardly ever be acknowledged in public space without exploding the myth of a democratically unified people from the very onset” (5).

However, in the cemetery, all are included both physically and symbolically. Physically, they were included, not necessarily because white citizens wanted to remember their darker contemporaries, but because something had to be done with their physical bodies. Although slave ships denied captured Africans a burial, with sharks trailing the floating prisons, for many African Americans the cemetery was the one concession recognizing their humanity (Wright and Hughes xvii, 3). Some of these cemeteries were integrated but segregated by section, some slaves and servants were buried with the families for which they had worked, but many were in marginal space, what the vast public saw as the only appropriate place. As far from the city center as possible and often covered over with buildings, streets, or rubbish piles, these cemetery locations were unwanted places.

Additionally, the cemetery included African Americans symbolically. While representations of blacks may not have been acknowledged in other public space, such did exist in cemeteries. According to Savage, “[p]ortraits of African Americans did appear in simplified linear form on slate gravestones dating to the eighteen century” (16). Citing examples from Newport, Rhode Island’s Common Burying Ground, Savage notes that there are probably numerous others that have not come to light. One such other that does not represent Africans but acknowledges them and remembers them symbolically is a beautiful headstone to a collective grave in a small Kittery, Maine graveyard:

Brig Hattie Eaton
W.I. to Boston
Island Mch 21, 1876
Crew of 8, white
And Negro, and 1 stowaway
Near this stone lie six
Bodies never claimed

In addition, “the first known instance of African American representation in marble or bronze” was found (where else but) in the cemetery (Savage 70).

However, in the liminal places where the cemeteries were located, little of this symbolism could or would be recognized by caucasian Americans. Tombstones with epitaphs were beyond the means of most African Americans; often an unchisled stone from a field was used to mark the site. The rituals of burial were perceived as primitive and ignored by white Americans. For example, in 1865 historian David Valentine wrote that one advantage of having the burial ground far from the city center was that white residents would not be bothered by the “native superstitions and burial customs” of the Africans. Such customs
included “burying by night, with various mummeries and outcries” (qtd. in Frohne).\textsuperscript{26} Still, despite this negative view of the Africans burial symbolism, the cemetery was considered an appropriate place for dead Africans and their funeral traditions. Thus, the physical and symbolic memory s/p[I]ace did exist, and the possibility existed that these memorials could represent, contest and invert.

\textbf{An African Burying Ground}

In eighteenth-century Portsmouth, NH, the situation was much the same as elsewhere in the country.\textsuperscript{27} Patriotic citizens wanted to perpetuate their tales of a democratically unified people, yet they had the problem of having to do something with the bodies of dead African Americans who had been slaves or poorly treated residents—but not citizens—of America. Though no one knows exactly how Portsmouth’s African burial ground came to be, historians agree that the location was part of “glebe land,” land given to a church minister to lease in order to earn an income. This place, located in what was at the time a remote spot on the outskirts of the city, was not considered particularly valuable. Low in value, the acreage leased to Africans seemed a reasonable use for this undesirable and swampy land.\textsuperscript{28} Far enough from the center of town, the physicality of the dead could be taken care of and then forgotten. The symbolic also seems to have been minimized because in the Portsmouth burial ground there is no evidence of head markers or other reminders of the dead.

This cemetery on glebe land, then, located far from what had been the eighteenth-century city’s center, was a place (lieu), but the city planners seemed to ensure that the cemetery was not a symbolic space (espace). Without this recognized symbolism, the physicality of the humans and their coffins could rot below the ground and easily be forgotten. And indeed this is what happened. In a town that has worked to preserve its history since its founding in 1623, many old cemeteries proclaim the memories of white Portsmouth residents. However, the place of the African American cemetery could be paved over, houses could be built on it, and no one would mourn the loss of this space for nineteenth-century urban renewal.

In fact, for years, scholars were not certain if the burial ground had ever been either a place or space. Though eighteenth-century maps had indicated such a burial ground, scholars wondered if the maps indicated the actuality of a burial ground or some undeveloped intent for such a place. Because the land was not perceived as symbolic space, all local historians knew was that an 1813 map indicated no burial ground on this place. While the city of Portsmouth worked to preserve the place and space of several other cemeteries, a graveyard for its black citizens was conveniently forgotten. So when, two centuries later, the city was replacing sewer pipes, it saw the land as merely place with little symbolic value.
However, the s/p[1]ace of the cemetery is so powerful that even this disempowered location did have some symbolic value. Stories circulated of a burial ground near Chestnut Street, in what is today the center of the city. Rumors existed that early twentieth-century workers had dug up bones when putting in the sewer system. Portsmouth’s Black Heritage Trail had a plaque placed on a building nearby noting the possible existence of such a cemetery. Because this remote possibility existed that this place might be a symbolic space, an architectural firm was on call “in case” something was discovered.

When something indeed was discovered, the town erupted. The construction workers stopped and the archeologists replaced them. Funeral homes’ hearses came by, and word of mouth spread as residents came to see what was going on. School classes took impromptu field trips to the site. The local newspapers told of this discovery and the story spread to the national news. Though the plaque a block away from the site of the discovery told that Portsmouth maps had indicated that a “African Burying Ground” had been located near the site, few could have imagined how the city would become so abuzz with news of this burial place. While many had known it probably existed for years earlier, the cemetery’s possibilities had never created this much interest. If it were not for the materiality of the body and the cemetery grave site, all this excitement would not have occurred. If bodies disappeared as easily as do human lives, these people’s existence could have been denied more easily than they can be with the presence of the material. Though no tombstones told of the people buried or of their accomplishments, the cemetery was an appropriate place to remember (and dispose of) bodies.

Of course, it is a rare few cemeteries that create such a commotion. Another African American burial ground, this one for slaves of the prominent Langdon family, sits with its unmarked stones about a mile down Route One from the newly discovered site. Few Portsmouth residents know about this quiet cemetery as it rests with only the sun reading its uninscribed epitaphs. However, because the essence of the Cemetery is that the Cemetery is and is not so much simultaneously, this quiet place has the possibility of calling out, of being exposed to the wise and the ignorant, of being read by schoolchildren and the national media.

Far from the center of the colonial city, to the affluent white residents of the city both of Portsmouth’s African American Cemeteries seemed controlled, silent and powerless when they were created. Yet today the discovery of this physical rhetorical memory space on Chestnut Street forces people of the twenty first century to rethink New England’s involvement with slavery. Perhaps the newly discovered cemetery is more potent than the one on Route One because it was paved over, damning the good citizens of Portsmouth more than could a preserved space for slaves. But it is more likely that this newly discovered cemetery is not necessarily more potent than the other; it is just
that now is the kairotic moment for this rhetorical space that has so long waited to speak. It has waited for when it could be remembered collectively, when the changing world would find its memory more acceptable. And because the cemetery is a heterotopian s/p[ll]ace, it has been allowed to wait.

**Political Correctness Run Amuck**

Certainly, many resist the voice of the cemetery. The city did not exactly embrace the discovery. Though leaders of the city were careful to do the right thing, the city’s priority was on completing its sewer renewal. Within two weeks of the discovery, the underground pipe work on the street of the graveyard had been complete and the ground filled in. (Mulkern). The archeological firm that was removing the coffins had to find shortcuts because of the city’s priorities. The primary archeologist for the project stated

If we had had the luxury of time we probably would have spent weeks here trying to get these individuals out right on site….With not having that option here, we pulled them out as blocks of intact clay so we could separate them from the soil and look at it [sic] a more leisurely pace. It was very physically draining and exerting work. (Goot)

Additionally, the plans to create a memorial to the dead at the location of the burial ground are creating much controversy. For example, one writer to the local paper argued that such memorials and preservation penalizes property owners, developers and architects who want to impact their community as those of previous centuries did (McCarthy). A local bank would agree with this sentiment, objecting to many of the memorial plans because they would create “a tremendous problem for the bank and something in a million years [the bank representative] could not get their support on” (Aronson). In one letter to the editor in the Portsmouth paper, a writer felt that the debate over the memorial was “political correctness…allowed to run amuck” (Avery):

There are locations of battles from the Indian wars, private burial places on homesteads, graves of explorers and people migrating west; the land is full of unknown, unmarked graves. What are we to do, shut down every highway, close off every bridge, knock down every building site, curtail all forward moving activities whenever a grave is stumbled upon? Get real.

Still, because the cemetery is both physical and symbolic, both space and place, it exists and inverts—even with this resistance.

One powerful testament to the potency of the cemetery as a s/p[ll]ace is the many attempts that have been made throughout history to remove the symbolism of this space. The most notable examples of such attempts can be found in this country’s earlier habit of objectifying human remains, in particular those of Native Americans. Throughout much of American history,
the remains of Native Americans were turned into museum artifacts, removed from their burial place so they would no longer be viewed as spiritual symbols. From a Mayflower scouting group robbing an Indian grave to Thomas Jefferson digging up Indian burial grounds, there has been a lack of respect for Native American remains (Echo-Hawk and Echo-Hawk). These attempts at desanctifying cemeteries are reminiscent of the battles over sacred space that Chidester and Linenthal describe (19). The answer to Andrea Frohne’s question, “when is a cemetery no longer sacred?” (4), in her work on the New York City African Burial Ground seems to be that the only way to deny a cemetery its role as a sacred space is to deny its existence as a cemetery, as symbolic space. When the cemetery remains a cemetery, it can still speak.

“There is nothing covered that shall not be revealed” Matthew 10:26

In his forward to Roberta Hughes Wright and Wilbur B. Hughes’ book documenting many other African American burial grounds such as that found in Portsmouth, Michael Blakey writes “[t]hese memorialized identities are sometimes neglected, lost, or later restored to memory. Once the corporal remains of a human life have been planted under earth, chances are good that they will be encountered again” (xiii). Though the city of Portsmouth had long ago forgotten about the black citizens buried beneath its streets, the materiality of the citizens themselves and the place in which they were buried allowed for the possibility that they would be rediscovered and become a symbolic space, and as this s/p[llace could become a rhetorical space.

In the twenty-first century, the graveyard’s physicality not only establishes its existence and symbolic importance. It tells about the people buried. Such is certainly true of the dead from Portsmouth’s Burying Ground. Currently, Boston University’s “Roots Project” is studying DNA from the bones to trace their genealogical heritage and to look for the dead’s descendants. Medical examiners have concluded that wounds on bones discovered indicated injuries synonymous with those created by slaves’ shackles. Wood that created the coffins can tell where these people lived and worked. Other material and the arrangement of bodies can begin to tell about cultures and habits. Most importantly, perhaps, it reminds this New England town that it was complicit with slavery; while across the city there may be a monument honoring the town’s Union dead from the Civil War, this town’s racial history is not much better than is that of most Southern towns. And because of the material existence of the cemetery, necessitated by the material existence of the body, this forgotten space can return and give us these messages.

The city of Portsmouth probably didn’t want to deal with this symbol and its potent rhetoric, yet the physicality of the location forced the city to do so. While activists may “attempt to counter the collected memories that have come to represent American national identity, though contesting the various
amnesias, memory voices, and stolen histories that have resulted in such memories” (S.C. Pearce 28), the activists’ attempts and contestations do not carry the symbolic power that the s/p[l]ace of the cemetery does. When the burial ground was merely espace, a space on the city’s Black Heritage Trail, it didn’t have the potency it has as lieu. When the burial ground was merely the lieu of Chestnut Street, it wasn’t espace. However, as something real and symbolic, the cemetery excites and troubles. It begins to deliver the rhetorical goods.

IV. A Rhetorical S/P[l]ace

The cemetery is ordinary, banal. However, this apparent ordinariness and banality make it extraordinary. Human bodies need to be disposed of. If they are not cremated, put to sea, left to rot or to wild animals, they are often buried in a place—and this place takes on a sacredness with the placement of the body in it. It becomes a space. As a s/p[l]ace, it can become a particularly potent memory space for many reasons.

First, the physicality of this rhetorical memory space helps people remember. As the ancient Greeks knew when they recognized the need for imaginary visual places in the ars memoria, the knowledge of any physical place helps people remember. Simodines knew the name of every person at a banquet because he could see in his mind the location where everyone sat. Memorials similarly help us remember. While we might hear a story of a person who saved another person’s life or accomplished some other heroic deed, we are likely to forget the story unless we have a physical place to make it more real. I know much of Paul Revere in great detail because I grew up around the marked locations of various places on his midnight ride and his preserved house was near my own. On the other hand, I knew nothing of any heroic adventures achieved by the people buried in downtown Portsmouth, people who most likely built this country. Now, though, I know they lived and I am more likely to learn of—or imagine—their adventures.

Physical locations also remain in our memory moreso than do mere ideas because, as Carole Blair observes, they “affect our material lives” (46). We can’t walk straight to the building because a statue is in the way. A memorial pool offers cool refreshment on a particularly hot day. Cemeteries cause headaches for builders and architects because they need to build around them or find ways to move them. Current plans for a memorial to those buried in Portsmouth create debate because some want the street over the gravesite to be closed off and turned into a memorial park. A neighboring bank believes such a road closure would be a hardship on the business. Yet this s/p[l]ace will also affect others who pass by, possibly creating at least a temporary curiosity. Wells’ memorial has become the destination for many pilgrimages honoring the female workers of the Lowell Mills. Today, as people go to the Wells grave,
they are also drawn to the graves of other mill girls buried nearby. For some, it might be a landmark guiding the way to another burial site; for others, it might be merely another grave they never see.

The story of those buried in Portsmouth is similar to those about the horrors of slavery and life for free blacks in early America that many other people and I have heard and forgotten. The story of nineteenth-century women working in very difficult conditions is one often denied in fantasies of femininity. However, with a concrete space commemorating these human beings, their stories are much more difficult to forget. Like the material monuments celebrating Paul Revere’s ride, these gravesites are constant reminders of these people’s stories. Anyone who knows where such a place is is likely to be reminded when passing near the space. The material and its space reminds not just Simodines.

Second, the reality of the physical place gives authority to the story. It makes the stories not only difficult to forget, but difficult to deny. Looking at very different physical monuments, Kathryn Allamong Jacob observes:

Mundane as they may appear, ubiquitous as they may be, public monuments constitute serious cultural authority. They are important precisely because, by their mere presence and their obvious expense, they impose a memory of an event or individual on the public landscape that orders our lives. These monuments confer legitimacy upon the memory they embody. Their size and costliness testify to its importance. And by imprinting one memory, they erase others. (5)

While the plaque commemorating the African Burial Ground as part of the Black Heritage trail did not create huge excitement in Portsmouth, the physical burial ground did. Similarly, the grave of women like Wells reminds people of all those others she represents. The graves physically exist. Additionally, they testify to their own importance because, as burial sites, they are sacred spaces. They contain human remains, and—as Kenneth Foote and Carol Blair argue—the act of observing an individual’s importance in a location, of commemorating through some kind of ceremony at the site, sanctifies and transforms a place. No longer is the space merely a material place, it has social significance. But conversely, the social significance is harder to forget because it has a concrete point of location.

Another reason the materiality of places makes a grave so powerful as a rhetorical memory space is that the memorial creates a kind of framework for our knowledge. We can’t remember everything. The material helps us remember and, as Jacob notes, when we have one memory imprinted on our mind, another is erased. Just as Simodines’ knowledge of the seating arrangement helped him remember who sat where, our knowledge of various rhetorical memory places creates a framework for what we remember. Without these
places, points on the framework are missing—memories are more difficult to retain. Or as John Shotler argues, “If events do not fit into the frameworks provided by one’s social institutions—into which one has been socialized—then they are not remembered” (131). By existing, Wells’ memorial and the African Burying Ground become points on this framework. They help us retain other pieces of history in New England, pieces we might otherwise ignore or let pass us by. As heterotopias allowed to exist, they represent, contest and invert.

Finally, the cemetery is a particularly potent place because it is allowed to exist. Memories of African Americans might have been prohibited from most all other memory spaces, memorials to women might seem laughable in public space, but in the cemetery this s/p[ll]ace exists with its symbolic power.

_Skeletons in the Cupboard of Public Memory_

Certainly, the physical presence of a cemetery memorial does not ensure that we will remember a particular person; public memory could not embrace each and every person who has a tombstone commemorating her or his life. Humans cannot remember that much. Sometimes people are remembered because wealth and privilege allow for the purchase of memorials in well-traveled locations, as in the case of all those famous burial sites that conventional history tells us of. Sometimes people are remembered because all the factors are just right, and the resulting memorial is stunning and unique, as in the case of Louisa Wells. Sometimes people are remembered because someone gets their shoe caught on a stone, or a backhoe uncovers an ancient coffin. Then that very real place again becomes a rhetorical memory space, even after it has been forgotten for decades, years, even centuries. And sometimes the rhetorical memory places simply decay—and are not remembered.

The cemetery as a rhetorical memory space allows for the possibility of these marginalized people being a part of public memory; it creates what Michael Schudson terms an “available past” (359). It allows for the possibility of the public visiting, reproducing, and knowing of the space. Though the space itself only gives us hazy and fleeting views of an unretrievable past, the place tells us something was there. It demands we begin to fill in the blanks. It tells us something was lost, thus implying something, though it is missing, is desired.²⁹

In a century that seems to cremate more than bury its dead, the issue of the cemetery as a rhetorical memory place might seem like past history and irrelevant to our present. Yet even with cremations, many people choose to create memorials, memory places. The cremation does not permit the body itself to speak as a memory s/p[ll]ace, but our society’s trend toward cremation does not suggest the cemetery is no longer connected to all. Instead it suggests that, like the evolution from burial ground to graveyard to cemetery, from temporary storage space for bones to eternal home, this heterotopian space is
changing, always reflecting, contesting and inverting the society from which it comes.

While Peter Burke writes that historians, as the guardians of memory, are guardians of the skeletons in the cupboard of social memory (110), cemeteries very literally are the guardians of such skeletons. And because cemeteries exclude much less than do historians and because skeletons are sacred and material, these rhetorical memory spaces are likely to be rediscovered in the future—and to be an available memory of what we might try to forget today.

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**Notes**

1. In this paper, I use the terms cemetery, graveyard, and burying (or burial) ground interchangeably although I recognize each has a distinct meaning. With these terms I refer to an area of land in which human remains are buried. Though the term “cemetry” was not commonly used to define burial places in America until the nineteenth century, I choose to use this term most frequently because it is used in the twenty first century. In my usage of “cemetery,” I also refer to burying grounds, family plots, and graveyards. For a brief overview of the word “cemetry,” see John Sears, *Sacred Places: American Tourist Attractions*, 108.

In this discussion, I am also aware that burial practices vary from culture to culture as well as over time. Although my focus is on cemeteries of New England, I believe my argument regarding the essence of the cemetery as an important memory space and place is applicable to the burial practices of other cultures.

2. For an excellent history of the beginnings of rhetoric and memory, see Frances Yates’ *The Art of Memory* as well as Mary Carruthers’ *The Book of Memory*.

3. Other rhetoricians who have noted how rhetorical space works to include and exclude are Roxanne Mountford, Nedra Reynolds, Raka Shome.

4. See, for example, Simon Schama who considers burial burrows to be the first human marks upon the landscape (26). Also, in the book on Genesis, numerous burials are mentioned. Elaboration on all the possible means of disposing of a dead body can be found in Ragon (5-11) and Prothero (2-4). Another tradition, not mentioned in these sources, is “famadihana,” found in Madagascar. This tradition of reburying the dead, even as remains disintegrate and are combined with other unrecognizable remains, provides physical contact with the memories of the past (Green).

5. In the original French, Foucault uses the word “espaces” for the location of the heterotopia.
6. Just as when Aristotle wrote that the question “what is place?” is “beset with difficulties” (78), the questions regarding definitions of and distinctions between place and space are still difficult—to say the least. Like the debate between Ada Louise Huxley and Herbert J. Gans over the terms “vernacular” and “architecture,” scholars may question these terms of location, not because they disagree but, because they are unable to understand each other’s language (Hayden 4). Part of the reason for this difficulty understanding each other’s language is caused by the many ways the terms space and place are used by scholars of rhetoric, philosophy, geography, history, architecture—to name just a few disciplines. While many of these scholars seem to use the terms “space” and “place” as deCerteau does (in addition to the scholars I’ve cited: Lefevre; Massey; Casey, Representing 30), others use them in very different ways (e.g., Rose, Tuan). Like Giddens who uses the terms slightly differently than does deCerteau but who recognizes the importance of separating the terms (18), many scholars note the multiple and contested meanings of these terms (Casey, Remembering xvii; Marin 13; Ó Tuathail 1; Rowe 12).

In my use of the terms “place” and “space,” I do not want to extend the debate or muddy the waters any further, but instead want to use already existing terms to try to understand the essence of the cemetery as a memory site. Certainly, I recognize that these terms have been discussed and debated since and before Aristotle and Plato, and that these terms (to use Richard McKeon’s words) “were as ambiguous in ordinary Greek as they are in ordinary English” (25). Perhaps use of deCerteau’s French terms can help us begin to lessen the ambiguity.

7. Although most of this information is common knowledge gained from newspaper articles printed during the time of the controversy leading to the movement of the statue to the Rotunda, the documentation for these dates and facts comes from Congresswoman Carolyn B. Malony’s website.

8. Much of the correspondence between Powell and the sculptor of Mount Rushmore, Gutzon Borglum, is in the Powell collection at Radcliffe’s Schlesinger Library, to whom I am grateful for allowing me access to this material. This correspondence suggests that Powell may have been close to having Anthony’s likeness included, not on the southeast face of the mountain with the four presidents, but in a “Great Hall of Records” on the west side of the mountain, in what Borglum terms a “secondary place,” honoring other great Americans ranging from Benjamin Franklin to the Wright brothers. Anthony’s bust and this Hall of Records never came to be because of Borglum’s premature death and World War II.

Additional information on Powell’s attempts can be found in Schama, Taliaferro White, and Taliaferro “Notes.”

9. Although there is not conclusive evidence that Wells was Irish, many of the female workers at the Lowell mills were. See Watkins re. the tradition of burying among Irish emigrants.
10. My biographical information on Louisa Wells comes from both Catherine Goodwin’s book on the Lowell Cemetery and papers from the archives of the Lowell Cemetery. I am indebted to both Ms. Goodwin and the Cemetery for making their resources available to me.

11. Military cemeteries are an exception to this lack of exclusivity, and there is much that needs to be considered in how these cemeteries shape both memory and gender.

12. See Schorsh and Scott.

13. See, for example, Jacobs.

14. Tony Bennett observes the same kind of Foucaultian power relation in the structure of the museum (100). This description of Mount Auburn’s town is also reminiscent of Roland Barthes’ description of the Eiffel Tower.

15. I first became aware of this definition from Casey.

16. See also Edgette for a discussion of the wide range of epitaphs.

17. Numerous works on Civil War monuments chronicle the difficult process of gaining approval for a public monument. Among them are Driggs et al., Savage, and Jacob.

18. I would not have noticed this similarity if it were not for F.W. Coburn’s 1936 article on the memorial, noting Longman’s sculpture’s similarity to French’s. Coburn notes the title of the sculpture as “Death Staying the Sculptor’s Hand.”

19. C.E. Pollack’s observation, that while mourners may perceive a cemetery as solely “a place to mourn their loved ones with their traditions,” those involved in advocacy and political organizations view[ed] burial as a means toward achieving political ends” (126), shows that those with political ends often invert the mourners meaning.

Similar examples of inversion such as that with Wells’ memorial can be found in cemeteries everywhere. For example, in her work on graveyards of the South, June Hadden Hobbs describes the surprisingly erotic expressions found on many women’s tombstones. Detailing many of the female expressions of passion and desire, Hobbs observes that these tombstones “are the highly allusive and heavily condensed expressions of values that order a culture, often in challenge to authoritative texts and official ecclesiastical policies.” Looking at very different Southern tombstones, Stephen Davis notes how after the Civil War many Southerners feared the consequences of creating public memorials to Confederate heroes: “Cemeteries afforded a more secluded as well as appropriate place in which to honor the Southern war dead” (5)

20. From a photocopied newspaper article in the archives of the Lowell Cemetery. The title of the newspaper and the article, as well as the date of the article are omitted from this copy.

21. Two viewers of a grave site near Wells offer readings of the grave that also demonstrate how the reflection of the norms can be inverted on the grave.
site. Virginia Taylor writes that her husband’s distant relative, Barilla Taylor, speaks to her through the gravesite of the difficulties she experienced in the mills. Suzanne Nielsen reads Taylor’s grave as implicating society in crimes against children.

22. For information on segregated cemeteries, see Krüger-Kahloula and Wright and Hughes. Krüger-Kahloula also cites Alf, a slave to Andrew Jackson, as an example of African Americans being buried with the families for which they served. Two other examples are Prince Whipple, a slave to William Whipple (a signer of the Declaration of Independence) buried near the Whipple family in the primarily white North Cemetery in Portsmouth, and Elizabeth Freeman (Mum-Bett), the servant of Catharine Sedgwick’s family, buried in Massachusetts’ Stockbridge Cemetery.

23. Wright and Hughes, Frohne and S.C. Pearce speak more directly to the worthlessness of the land used for African burials.

24. Information on this grave and others in Kittery’s Old Parish Burying Ground can be found in Batignani.

25. For example, in Portsmouth, New Hampshire on the property of Christ Episcopal Church on Route 1, there is a burial ground for people enslaved by the prominent Langdon family with ordinary rocks marking some of the grave sites (Cunningham et al).

26. Frohn additionally notes that laws were enacted to minimize the symbolic element of this rite. For example, in New York City, eighteenth-century laws required Africans to hold their burials only at daylight and with a maximum of twelve mourners attending (163).

27. My source for information on the burial ground comes from conversations with both Valerie Cunningham, a member of the Mayor’s Blue Ribbon Committee of African Burial Ground and founder of the Portsmouth Black Heritage Trail, and Katherine Wheeler, the director and principle archaeologist for Independent Archaeology Consulting, the company that oversaw the disinterment of the Portsmouth graves. Additionally, numerous articles from the Portsmouth Herald’s on-line archives have provided me information. One source that gives an excellent overview of all this information is J. Dennis Robinson’s article from an on-line journal.

28. The fact that the ground in which these bodies were places is so wet provides the explanation for why the coffins were so well preserved. Unlike the New York City burial ground where the coffins had decayed but the bodies remained intact, this burial ground better preserved the coffins rather than the bodies. Because the wood was under water and remained under water, it was in an environment that better preserved wood.

29. See Susan Crane’s discussion of how museum collections affirm worthiness, emphasizing the importance of what is lost. It is from this discussion that I have gained the idea that loss “implied what is desired by missing,” and lack is “what is absent and unwanted despite its existence” (9-10).
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