This paper discusses the positionality of English in South Korea as a form of symbolic capital that represents the discursive power of Americanism and East Asian Social Darwinism. By employing Bourdieu's and Foucault's theoretical orientations, this paper traces how South Korean linguistic policies to incorporate English loan words coincide with South Korea's struggle to face its historical challenges from a pre-modern to a modern postcolonial society. In doing so, this paper illustrates how Americanization is conceived as the process of winning global competition where only the 'survival of the fittest' reigns (a Social Darwinist discourse that justifies the power of Americanism).

**Keywords:** foreign language education; language policy; intercultural exchange; discourse; power relations

**Introduction**

The role of English education has long been a subject of serious public discussions in South Korea. Recently, when the new South Korean President, Myung-Bak Lee, proposed the *Yǒng-ó Mol-Ip Kyo-Yuk*, 'English Immersion Education' policy, to teach every high school class in English, it again brought about intense public debates. In a meeting with the Presidential Transition Committee, then President-elect Lee emphasized 'how English ability is the competitive power of individuals and states':

As you all know well if you travel abroad, depending on how well they speak English in the non-English speaking countries makes a difference in their incomes, like you get a
Those countries with the people who speak English well in the non-English speaking countries, compared to those with their people who don’t use English well, live far better... It will be more likely the case in the future in the globalized world.... Accept this reality, and give our total effort, so that our growing children can march toward the world and stand at the center of the world, which is our responsibility. (The Reason of Lee President-Elect’s English Love, 2008)

The Chair of the Presidential Transition Committee, KyungSook Lee, also commented that ‘Those advanced countries with individuals with over $50,000 annual income are prepared ones that their people learn English, in addition to their own language, from elementary school’ (Park, 2008), and she emphasized that they will make English education ‘as national agenda, most emphasized in the coming five years’ (Lee KyungSook, 2008). From the perspective of President Lee and his staff, this was just an obvious choice; he deemed that: (1) Korea must join in the global world and make itself more competitive, (2) English is a necessary means of success in the global competition, and (3) otherwise, Korea will lose and perish.

This rhetorical justification operates with certain assumptions that invite the following questions: Is the nature of the global world competitive? If English is a necessary means of success in the global competition, what about other successful nations in the global world that do not speak English as their primary language, such as Japan, Germany, and France? Is the only end result either to perish or to survive future competition? Must Korea join in this competitive (or combative) battle?

With the rhetorical justification’s obvious weakness in failing to respond to these issues, as well as public concerns over its ramifications (especially parents worrying about further financial burden for their children’s English education, to meet with the intensified English education policy), President Lee eventually had to withdraw the plan to launch the English Immersion Education policy (Yu, 2008). On 20 March 2008, although President Lee still affirmed that English is a ‘tool needed for competing in the twenty-first century,’ he said, ‘There is no way to implement English immersion policy now’. More importantly, however, the rhetoric nevertheless has retained significant power in the history of South Korea. Consider, for example, the following facts that show the size of the English language market and seriousness of the ‘Englishization’ business in South Korea. According to Statistics Korea, the State Statistics Agency, Koreans spent over US$19 billion on English education in 2009, such as attending private education and language schools both domestically and internationally (Jung, 2010). Some 40,000 South Koreans in 2008 were recognized as ‘migrating wild geese families,’ forcing their children (in most cases elementary school children) to go abroad with their mothers to study English, living apart from their fathers who are left behind working to financially support the endeavor. Further, the demand for native English teachers and lecturers has constantly been expanding under the name of internationalization (Onishi, 2008). These figures exemplify the ever-present power of English in South Korean society that has functioned simultaneously as systemic obligation and psychological burden. In short, President Lee’s discourse is a common public parlance in today’s South Korea.

Commonly, the cause of this ‘English fever’ is attributed to ‘the long traditions of education fever in the country’ (Park, 2009, p. 50) and ‘traditional Confucian attitudes toward learning... as a way of achieving status and power’ (Seth, 2002, pp. 6–9). The education fever has made South Korea ‘the most exam-obsessed culture in the world’ (Seth, 2002, p. 5), and in this culture,
education is seen as the most powerful means to achieve upward social mobility and economic prosperity, and many Korean parents believe that they can help their children succeed by emphasizing, and even imposing, education for their children. (Park, 2009, pp. 50–51)

Park (2009) argues that the most important source of ‘the current English boom’ is the South Korean government’s introducing an ‘English-only trend in academia,’ along with ‘the plan to teach English in all elementary school grades,’ and the ‘new focus on oral language proficiency in English’ (p. 52). This suggests a belief that English proficiency would strengthen South Korea’s international competitiveness; as further support, it is worth noting that even local governments have joined this boom, by establishing ‘English villages’ where ‘a great number of native speakers of English have been hired as villagers of the English-immersion towns’ (p. 53). However, we argue, the observation that ‘English fever’ is rooted in South Korea’s traditional/Confucius fever on education and is caused by South Korean government policies does not account for much deeper socio-structural, historical, and political dynamics that produce the current boom and foster supportive government policies on English education. Nor does it explain the fundamental assumptions underpinning and driving the fever. Instead, this paper argues that the current support for English instruction is rooted in the discursive power of Americanism and, in this instance, its corollary, East Asian Social Darwinism. We argue that the power of Americanism and East Asian Social Darwinism is still widely and deeply spread, especially in countries like South Korea, even though the discourse has been seriously challenged and deconstructed, at least in the academic field (e.g. the ‘short lived...end of history school’) (Said, 1996, p. 112).

This paper critically engages President Lee’s rhetoric/discourse (i.e. (1) the world is a battlefield, (2) English is a key weapon for survival, and (3) without English, Korea will lose and perish), as a common parlance and as both systemic obligation and psychological burden. Inspired by Michel Foucault’s (1977, 1980, 1988) and Pierre Bourdieu’s (1972/1977, 1980/1990, 1987/1994) projects, this paper questions: (1) what are the socio-structural and institutional mechanisms that produce the power of discourse in South Korean society? and (2) how is the discursive power internalized by individual subjects or agents? In other words, by employing Foucault’s theoretical concepts of discourse-knowledge-power and Bourdieu’s habitus-doxa-field, not as a method but as a theoretical orientation or ‘thinking tools’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1989, p. 50), this paper examines the interrelationship between structural and institutional mechanisms and subjective beliefs and accompanying social truths, and how both objective and subjective elements are mutually constitutive, inseparable, and always complicit with each other.

In doing so, we argue that the positionality of English in South Korea represents the discursive power of Americanism and East Asian Social Darwinism (doxic knowledge). More precisely, English functions as an indicator (symbolic capital) of Americanization, an attitude and idea which champions a ‘survival of the fittest’ orientation toward the social order (field). This evolves into a Social Darwinist discourse that justifies the power of Americanism. Therefore, we argue that South Korean linguistic policies to incorporate foreign languages, especially incorporating English loan words into Korean, coincide with South Korea’s struggle to face its historical challenges from a pre-modern to a modern postcolonial society.
In what follows, we first discuss our theoretical ‘thinking tools’ that illustrate the interrelationality of habitus-doxa-field and discourse-knowledge-power. Second, we examine the discursive roots of Lee’s rhetoric (i.e. the world is a battlefield and the Western rule as the survival of the fittest), Americanism and East Asian Social Darwinism, as doxic knowledge, that underpin the unequal power relationship between the West and the East in general, and the USA and South Korea in particular. Third, we trace the development of South Korean national language and its linguistic policies on foreign languages as structural and institutional mechanisms that contextualize the positionality of English (i.e. English is a key weapon for survival), in relation to the historical trajectory of establishment and further development of South Korea as a modern (and post/colonial) nation-state. Following this discussion, this paper proposes that the reception and accommodation of the English language in South Korean language synecdochically represents how South Korea internalized an East Asian Social Darwinism that views Americanization as symbolic capital in achieving modernization and Westernization.

**Habitus-doxa-field and discourse-knowledge-power**

For Bourdieu (1972/1977, 1980/1990, 1987/1994), an individual agent’s behavioral and cognitive dispositions, whether conscious or unconscious, reflect much deeper sociohistorical power relations. Bourdieu names this subjective element of practice ‘habitus,’ depicted as ‘structured and structuring structure’ (Bourdieu, 1987/1994, p. 170), and ‘acquired in the course of individual life trajectories’ (Grenfell, 2008, p. 47). Individual habitus is structured by one’s sociohistorical conditions (e.g. family, education, etc.), and, in turn, an individual’s practice structures his/her ‘way of being, a habitual state (especially of the body) and, in particular, a predisposition, tendency, propensity, or inclination’ [emphasis in the original] (Bourdieu, 1972/1977, p. 214). Ultimately, this internalized ‘way of being’ provides a logic of social order, structured by the ruling class’s hierarchical symbolic/discursive system, which justifies and reproduces class structure and social inequity (field): ‘Habitus contributes to constituting the field as a meaningful world’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 127). Therefore, through the theorization of ‘habitus,’ Bourdieu (1972/1977) stresses ‘the dialectic of the internalization of externality and the externalization of internality’ (p. 72).

To further illustrate this internalized arbitrary social order (habitus), and its relationship to field, Bourdieu introduces ‘doxa’ ‘as common parlance’ (Thompson, 2008, p. 70) – as ‘what is taken-for-granted,’ or ‘unquestioned “shared beliefs” constitutive of a field’ (Deer, 2008, pp. 120–121):

> As such [unquestioned], doxa allows the socially arbitrary nature of power relations (e.g., classifications, values, categorizations and so on) that have produced the doxa itself to continue to be misrecognized and as such to be reproduced in a self-reinforcing manner… Doxa is the cornerstone of any field to the extent that it determines the stability of the objective social structures through the way these are reproduced and reproduce themselves in a social agent’s perceptions and practices; in other words in the habitus. (Deer, 2008, p. 121)

The extent to which an agent’s habitus feels ‘natural’ in relation to a field, ‘like fish in water’ (Maton, 2008, p. 57), an individual agent’s habitus, masters the ‘rules of the game,’ and provides certain ‘capital,’ or ‘types of assets that bring social and cultural
advantage and disadvantage’ (Moore, 2008, p. 104). Therefore, Bourdieu’s theorization of habitus-doxa-field illustrates the ‘inseparable, mutually constituted and always inter-penetrating’ (Grenfell, 2008, p. 47) nature between objective structural power relations and subjective individual dispositions.

From another angle, the inseparable, mutually constitutive, interrelationship between social structures and institutions and an individual’s way of being is equally emphasized in Foucault’s projects (1977, 1980, 1988), by bringing ‘the problems of social reproduction and all the elements of the so-called superstructure back to within the material, fundamental structure and define this terrain not only in economic terms but also in cultural, corporeal, and subjective ones’ (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 27). Foucault accomplishes this through his theorization of discourse-knowledge-power. For Foucault, any individual’s speech or thought reflects his/her sociohistorical conditions, as the speech/thought ‘involves certain assumptions, prejudices, blindness and insights, all of which have a historical provenance, but exclude other, possibly equally valid, statements’ (Ashcroft, Griffiths, & Tiffin, 1998, p. 73). To highlight this relationship between sociohistorical conditions and individual parlance (or habitus in Bourdieu’s sense), Foucault introduces a new notion of ‘discourse’ – as it ‘defines and produces the objects of our knowledge. It governs the way that a topic can be meaningfully talked about and reasoned about. It also influences how ideas are put into practice and used to regulate the conduct of others’ (Hall, 1997, p. 44); therefore, discourse ‘sets the rules, norms and conventions by which social life is ordered and governed’ (p. 4).

What is significant about Foucault’s discussion of discourse is that it focuses on the shifting moment or mechanism through which individual parlance becomes doxa (unchallenged, shared belief), and historically contingent knowledge becomes truth, by joining knowledge with non-discursive practices, institutional regularities, and techniques of government, and by radically politicizing discourse:

Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the types of discourses which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanism and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statement, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true. (Foucault, 1980, p. 131)

In other words, Foucault’s (1977) notion of discourse joins knowledge and power, and emphasizes the productive nature of power; ‘we are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth’ (Foucault, 1980, p. 93).

As Bourdieu theorizes the role of doxa, as ‘what is taken-for-granted’ or ‘unquestioned “shared beliefs” constitutive of a field’ (Deer, 2008, pp. 120–121), as a first step for a strategy of resistance and for a possibility of social change, Foucault also stresses the importance of critiquing and challenging these unquestioned assumptions, modes of thought, and knowledges (i.e. doxa):

A critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kind of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought the practices that we accept rest... [it is] to show that things are not as self-evident as one believed, to see that what is accepted as self-evident
With this critical spirit in mind, in the next section we examine the discursive roots of ‘the truths, or doxa, that are common parlance’ (Thompson, 2008, p. 70) in South Korea – Americanism and East Asian Social Darwinism. These twin roots constitute, justify, and reinforce the ‘English fever’ and unequal yet naturalized power relationship between the West and the East in general, and the USA and South Korea in particular.

The world is a battlefield: Western rule as the survival of the fittest

South Korean President Myung-Bak Lee’s rhetoric on the positionality of English, underpinned by a doxic knowledge of the world as a battlefield and English as a key weapon (symbolic capital) for survival, reflects much deeper sociohistorical desires and conditions that South Korea has internalized through its modernization. Indeed, Park (2003, 2005) argues that East Asian Social Darwinism, which understands the world as a battlefield and the West/America as the only way of survival, is the most consistent and powerful discourse that runs through the development of South Korea from its inception as a modern nation-state. East Asian Social Darwinism was first introduced in Korean society in the nineteenth century, when Korea was struggling to form a modern nation-state, by the ‘new-modern’ intellectuals who were educated mostly in Japan or the USA. Although these new elites were relatively familiar with modern/Western discourses, the ‘new-modern’ intellectuals first accessed Social Darwinism through Liang Ch’I-Ch’ao and Kato Hiroyuki, Asian master theorists of Social Darwinism (Park, 2005).

Promoting the principle of ‘the survival of the fittest’ as a prime universal within the social order, the original architects of Social Darwinism, such as Thomas Malthus (1798/2007), William Kirby (1835), Charles Darwin (1909),1 Herbert Spencer (1896a, 1896b), and William Sumner (1911) advocated that evolution for all living things is realized through a model of competition. That is, because there are only limited resources available on earth, lives for all living things are protected through competition for survival (see Malthus, 1798/2007). On the other hand, the Asianized Social Darwinism by Liang Ch’I-Ch’ao and Kato Hiroyuki puts nation and race as a prime unit of universal competition (Park, 2005). According to the East Asian version of Social Darwinism, national and racial competition at the level of civilization will only intensify over natural resources, and for nation and people to survive and win, ‘the ignorant common people’s absolute obedience to the competitive upper class people (i.e., the nobility and the divine emperor) is an absolute prerequisite’ (Park, 2005, p. 75). Supported by the Western Social Darwinian masterminds, this East Asian Social Darwinism is based on the racist notion that, unlike its Western counterpart, Asians must develop national power before they are able to achieve individual enlightenment (Park, 2005). In turn, as Park (2005) argues, this collective interpretation of ‘survival’ demanded the ethos of obedience and sacrifice to ‘our’ collectives.

Further, Park’s (2005) discussion of why this East Asian Social Darwinism was attractive for the new-modern Korean intellectuals is insightful to illustrate the interrelationship among discourse-knowledge-power or habitus-doxa-field: (1) as their old dynasty/state was becoming extinct by the Western/superior powers, the
West's social Darwinist ideology of national power and aggressiveness for survival seemed more attractive than traditional Confucian thought, which was deemed a reason for Korea's national crisis; (2) the East Asian Social Darwinism's national competition and national self-empowerment for survival seemed a remedy for saving the nation; and (3) the new/modern/enlightenment intellectuals could rule out the traditional Confucian intellectuals who 'weren't really helpful for the people's survival' and rule over 'the ignorant common people' (p. 84) who do not understand Western civilization. Park's analysis illustrates why the aggressive 'discourse of power' was conceived in Korea almost synonymously with the arrival of 'modernity,' and why this somewhat problematic theory had been persistently powerful as the only way to secure the nation's survival.2

The most unique aspect of East Asian Social Darwinism is its 'Occidental twist' of Social Darwinism's original tenets (Park, 2005). If Social Darwinism provides a trans-generational viewpoint, Occidentalism offers a cross-spatial perspective. Although the histories of Occidentalism and Orientalism are different, as Orientalism (Said, 1978) provides a western-centered discourse that objectifies the Orient, Occidentalism, as Orientalism's discursive other, also offers a binary discourse, stereotyping the West. However, as Carrier (1995) has observed, the notion of Occidentalism, unlike its counterpart – Orientalism – has received relatively little attention among scholars until recently (Buruma & Margalit, 2004; Carrier, 1995). Instead, the notion of Occidentalism, implied in discourses of Orientalism, is a mirror to the counterpart representation; as a Western researcher's self image, as a rural villager's gaze toward the Western Other, and as a means to solidify differences between self and other (Carrier, 1995). When Said (1978) denied the presence of the Orient as a concrete entity 'just [being] there,' he also refuted the meaning of Occident as 'geographical or cultural entities' (pp. 4–5). Rather, for Said (1978), the 'Orient is an idea that has a history and a tradition of thought, imagery, and vocabulary that have given it reality and presence in and for the West' (p. 5). The Orient thus is projected through the eyes of the West; and this very encounter between Western Self and Eastern Other also creates another kind of projection – that of Occidentalism through the Eastern Self's eyes. Occidentalism, then, is a binary option that meets its needs 'in and for' (Said, 1978, p. 4) one's own culture and society.

As is the case of Said's discussion of Orientalism, a main function of Occidentalism is essentialization (either utmost positive or negative), as manifested in the tendency 'to reduce the complex entities that are being compared to a set of core features that express the essence of each entity, but only as it stands in contrast to the other' (Carrier, 1995, p. 3). Buruma and Margalit (2004) trace the utmost negative stereotyping of the West, in the eyes of its enemies, as 'a form of pure destruction' and 'less than human':

The Occidentalist view of the West is of a bourgeois society, addicted to creature comforts, animal lusts, self-interest, and security. It is by definition a society of cowards, who prize life above death. As a Taliban fighter once put it during the war in Afghanistan, the Americans would never win, because they love Pepsi-Cola, whereas the holy warriors love death. This was also the language of Spanish fascists during the civil war, and of Nazi ideologues, and Japanese kamikaze pilots. (Buruma, 2004, p. B10)

An equally problematic and sweeping generalization is the utmost positive version of Occidentalism (Carrier, 1995). Again, in this version, the West is
understood not as they are, but rather as what they symbolize – rational, civilized, and developed. And, what these symbolized categories reflect are the East’s self-reflection that seems to be opposite to the West – irrational, uncivil, and underdeveloped. In reality, however, differences between the Orient and the Occident do not exist in a clear-cut manner, and the boundary between the two often blurs. For instance, in 1970 an English anthropologist (Bishop), after his trip to Korea, wrote of the ways of living in this Eastern country as lazy and slow, and commented on the length of time consumed on food and social interactions (Park, 2005). However, as Park (2005) comments on the English anthropologist’s outdated observation, in South Korea today, people live with severe competition under the banner of a slogan – pal-li-pal-li (quickly, quickly), and the people tolerate the enormous stress levels they have to cope with in their daily lives. Therefore, argues Park, from the standpoint of South Koreans today, ‘England, the very homeland for Bishop, should look like “slow” ways of living’ (p. 18). For another example, one could argue that South Korea today has become more technologically savvy than Western countries in terms of what ‘Western’ used to represent – advancement of technology. A statistical study (Chadwick, 2006, p. 56) on the number of Internet users per 100 inhabitants shows that South Korea ranks as the third, the USA as the fourth, and the UK as the sixteenth. Again, the boundary between the Orient and the Occident blurs. In general, however, the positive version of Occidental ideology, the very thought to ‘catch up’ to the Western civilization, reflects the Orient’s desire. Essentialization of the Other, in this context the Occident, reflects the Orient’s desire. Essentialization of the Other, in this context the Occident, reflects the Orient’s desire. 

Lindstrom (1995) explains that what is grounded in discourses of positive Occidentalism is an essence of desire. As stated above, despite the complexities that exist in each society, the Occident is reduced to the entities that are quite opposite characteristics to the Orient. In this comparison, states Lindstrom (1995), the Orient ‘may serve within [an] evolutionary or dialectical model as the primitive, the ancient, or the grandfather. Equally, it may be the savage, the child, or the younger brother. It may be female to an occidental male. It might be nature to occidental culture; or sinful heathen to God’s elect’ (p. 34). In this kind of stark polarization, therefore, the Orient, as an object for colonization and racializing the Other, is considered not entirely human (Mills, 1997). An important consequence of Occidentalism, however, is blind absorption of the polarized characteristics on the part of the Orient. The Occident, then, from the Orient’s viewpoint, can be an object of desire, something for which they need to aspire.

A consequence of Korea’s absorption of positive Occidental knowledge, along with the new-modern elites’ active pursuit of East Asian Social Darwinism, is the sense of what DuBois (1903/2007) calls ‘double-consciousness’ in the formation of their identities. As DuBois (1903/2007) referred to his own African American consciousness, a sense of double consciousness is ‘a peculiar sensation... the sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity’ (p. 8). Therefore, posits DuBois, the feeling of ‘two-ness’ – ‘two souls; two thoughts; two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals’ (p. 8) – experienced in one body creates strife in the self. Similarly, as social and political leaders from the colonized country and/or as victims of an ‘inferior’ race, Korean modern-elite intellectuals were deeply troubled by their Occidental desire on the one hand and their position as the weaker national entity under Social Darwinist ideology on the other. Applied to the Korean context, we
argue that South Korea’s ‘readiness’ to accept ‘foreign-as-powerful’ and ‘America as the telos of modernity’ can be found in its history of development to a modern nation-state, which provided the country with an historical and discursive background for today’s acceptance of English. To advance this argument, in the next section we trace South Korea’s active reception, accommodation, and internalization of the English language and English education within the sociohistorical context of Korea’s modernization process by illustrating the interrelationship between the discourse of East Asian Social Darwinism and structural/institutional mechanisms.

English is a key weapon for survival in the jungle of global competition
Myung-Bak Lee’s East Asian Social Darwinian rhetoric on the mastery of English as a symbolic capital is meaningful only when the discourse is situated within a specific historical context, a field of power relations – ‘like fish in water’ (Maton, 2008, p. 57). Therefore, we now turn to offer a little historical background that produced the power, or the truth effect, of the discourses of East Asian Social Darwinism and Americanism. Further, in this historical analysis, we will illustrate how floating (slippery and confounded) signifiers like ‘modern’ were replaced by the ‘Western,’ which again was replaced by ‘American.’ In this sense, our analysis testifies to the triumphant history of American hegemony (politically and discursively) in South Korea, which further justified the discourse of Americanization as a synecdochic representation of modernization and Westernization. Again, our purpose for this historical discussion is to show how the linguistic policies related to foreign languages (e.g. the positionality of English as a symbolic capital) reflect much deeper sociohistorical conditions and cultural-political changes experienced by South Korea in its struggle to navigate its path to modernization and Westernization. We first trace the development of Korean national language and its linguistic policies on foreign languages before and after the establishment of South Korea as a modern nation-state. In doing so, we propose that the reception and accommodation of English language in South Korean language synecdochically represents how South Korea internalized East Asian Social Darwinism that views Americanization as a symbolic capital to master modernization and Westernization, and ultimately to win cultural, political, and economic power.

Korean language before the establishment of South Korea
Although the typology of the Korean language is still debated, it is generally believed that the Korean language belongs to the Ural-Altaic family, and it shares its roots with Mongolian, Manchu-Tungus, and Turkish languages (Hong, 2000; Sohn, 1999). The first establishment of a ‘common tongue’ came with the Shin-La’s (an ancient dynasty) unification of most of the states in the Korean peninsula in 676, through a dialect of Kyung-Ju, the capital city of Shin-La (Ko, 1999). The common tongue soon changed, however, as subsequent dynasties took over, bringing a new capital city along with each shift in power. The Korean letter system was not available until Han’Gûl (the current Korean letter system) was invented in 1446 under the leadership of the Great King Se-Jong. Until then, Chinese letters were used as the official written language, to record history, to compose poems, and sometimes to write the Korean words by employing the sound of Chinese characters. Although the invention of Han’Gûl brought a significant development of common language and
literary works in Korean, until the modern era Han’Gül was more popular among the lay people and women, while the aristocrats and the ruling class preferred the Chinese letter system as the official, institutional written language. Until the modern era, proficiency in Chinese letters and literature, including classical texts of Confucianism, was a central part (cultural capital) of the examination of aristocrats seeking governmental/political careers.

The power of Chinese language as symbolic capital was challenged in the nineteenth century, as Korea was leaving its pre-modern era and as China itself became the prey of modern, imperial Western superpowers. Especially for those who considered China as the center and the only superpower of the world, the defeat of China by the Western empires (e.g. the British, the French, the Russian, and the United States) was a moment for a paradigm shift (National History Teachers Association, 2002; Park, 2007). Now, it seemed, the center of the universe was moved from China to the West. This shift of paradigm (i.e. world view) also signaled a new era of globalization for Korea; in Korea’s relation to ‘the world’ out there, it was no longer China but the West that became Korea’s primary reference – in short, from then on, experiencing the ‘West,’ not China, meant the ‘world.’

As the world was experiencing the explosive development of capitalism and imperial expansion of aggressive nationalism, nineteenth century Korea was also a critical time for volatile social changes: dynastic authority was challenged by both domestic and international power groups, and the majority of Koreans were doubly exploited by both domestic and international oppressors, with growing demands for social reform from the grassroots (Cumings, 1997; Kang, 1984). More and more Western (American, French, British, German, Russian, etc.) ships appeared in Korean waters, demanding their ‘right’ to trade in the Korean peninsula. Due to their earlier exposure to Western empires and armed with modernized military weapons, China and Japan also joined the ranks of Western nations struggling for power in Korea. The biggest challenge of the time, then, was how Korea should situate itself vis-à-vis these (modernized and Westernized) nation-states. It was within this historical context and complex power relations that East Asian Social Darwinism gained its discursive power, as we discussed earlier, particularly among the new-modern, Westernized intellectuals within Korea (Park, 2005).

In this explosive historical turmoil, as Korea was struggling to establish a modern sovereignty, or to survive in the ‘jungle’ of global imperialism, Han’Gül was first recognized as the official national letter system in 1894, and later a contemporary spelling system was founded in 1933, a dictionary compilation project was launched, and the assessment for the standard language (defined as ‘Korean language as used by the middle class in the Seoul area’) was set forth in 1936 (Ko, 1994, p. 141). In addition, in 1896, the first modern private newspaper (Independence Newspaper) was published in both Korean and, interestingly, English. As Anderson (2006) illustrates, the print media played a constitutive role in the construction of a modern nation-state, as an ‘imagined community.’ In other words, at the dawn of modernity in South Korea, the new, modern, enlightenment intellectuals, educated in the USA and Japan, who were the first importers of East Asian Social Darwinism, actively shaped the ‘national imagination’ and a ‘world view’ vis-à-vis the Western world view. It was this new modern media (e.g. the Independence Newspaper) that was used to invoke their version of the world (i.e. East Asian Social Darwinism). A perfect example of the common parlance of the time can be found in the Independence Newspaper: ‘The White race is the most intelligent, diligent, and brave’ (cited in Park,
From this perspective, the Koreans were ‘lazy, stupid, disobedient to the law of Government, deceptive to each other, doubtful between the upper and the lower classes, always noisy, not worried about their country’s affairs as if it is others’ nation, and sick people who cannot be saved even by a great commander like Napoleon’ (cited in Park, 2007, p. 126).

Despite its efforts to establish a sovereign nation-state, however, Korea was colonized by Imperial Japan in 1910. While Japanese imperialism took the form of economic exploitation enforced with military power, it also utilized ‘cultural’ strategies to dominate Korea: the Japanese colonizing force banned the use of Korean language and Korean language education through the ‘Korean Annihilation Policy’; it required Koreans to pledge their loyalty to the Japanese Emperor and to worship Japanese imperial ancestors at Shinto (Japanese native religion) shrines; and it forced Koreans to convert their Korean names into Japanese names (Dudden, 2005). Consequently, as Weiner (1994) observes, Japan’s assimilation policies toward Korea ‘demanded no less than absolute acculturation; the complete abandonment of an independent Korean identity and its replacement by Japanese institutions and forms of behavior’ (p. 5) In this historical-political context, East Asian Social Darwinism gained more ‘truth value,’ or symbolic capital, for both the oppressors and the oppressed: for the Japanese imperial oppressors, East Asian Social Darwinism justified Japan’s military power and rule over Korea; for the oppressed Koreans, East Asian Social Darwinism not only explained why they were colonized (due to their inferior power) but also offered a strategy of survival – to become powerful just like the Western counterpart – the ‘double-consciousness’ (DuBois, 1903/2007). Then, the Liberation came on 15 August 1945, with the ‘unconditional surrender’ by the Japanese Emperor. It is from this time that East Asian Social Darwinism met ‘Americanism’ as a signifier substituted for other signifiers like ‘Westernization’ and ‘modernization,’ as the USA started to appear in the South Korean history as the symbol of emancipation and historical progress – the ruler of all. Perhaps, the more South Koreans perceived the insurmountable power of imperial Japan (primarily from Japan’s modernization and Westernization), the more they must have felt the immense presence of American power. America’s victory over the past power (i.e. Imperial Japan) was then interpreted as the evidence of historical progression according to East Asian Social Darwinism. From then on, in the hegemonic South Korean history, America(nization) started to become the ultimate signifier that stands for the telos of the future and for the values of East Asian Social Darwinism – modernization and Westernization.

The Liberation, unfortunately, also meant separate occupation of interim military governments by the USA in South Korea and the Soviets in North Korea. The interim military governments by the USA and the Soviets, however, had different policies toward postcolonial residues in Korea (Oberdorfer, 1997). While the Soviets immediately suspended Japanese military, police, administrators, and other pro-Japanese groups in North Korea as ‘feudal and colonial legacies,’ the USA suspended any radical (read Leftist) social reform and maintained the colonial administrative systems in order to sustain a social order and to immediately build a strong anti-communist block (Cumings, 1981, 1995, 1997; Kang, 1984). In other words, the pre-modern landed, ruling class had a different fate in South Korea: as many of them reserved their power during the colonial era through collaboration with the Japanese imperial force, they sustained their power after the liberation as they pledged their loyalty to ‘Americanism’ and ‘anti-communism’ (Cumings, 1997;
Kang, 1984). Perhaps this is the reason why East Asian Social Darwinism and Americanism, ‘the Western/American rule as the survival of the fittest,’ a Right-Wing, Conservative ideology that justifies the logic of the ruler, reigned throughout the history of South Korea, because it effectively suspended any grounds to nurture social conditions for the emergence of a Left-Wing, Socialist ideology, thereby seeing the world through the eyes of coalition, equality, and structural reform. We further highlight this point later when we contrast the South Korean formation of social structures/conditions and linguistic policies.

Kang (1984) argues that the tie between the US interim military government and precolonial power groups grew stronger, as domestic instability was increased by the intense public discontent over the maintenance of colonial power groups and the lack of social reform. Aggravated by the stark ideological confrontations between the left and the right, both internationally and domestically, South and North Korea held separate elections to establish their sovereign governments: South Korea on 15 August 1945 and North Korea on 9 September 1948. Then the Korean War broke out in 1950, ending after 3 years and 1 month with 1.5 million fatalities and 3.6 million injured and further intensifying the Cold War, domestically and internationally (Kang, 1984; Kim, 2003). In this intense ideological confrontation, the discursive articulation of ‘American’ as a symbol of emancipation and historical progress was ever more highlighted and solidified, in relation to its symbolic Other, characterized as an oppressive, violent, backward, poor, authoritarian, Communist North.

As we briefly traced the historical formation of South Korea as a modern nation-state and the development of the Korean language, in the next section we discuss South Korea’s national linguistic policies on English more specifically after its formation as a nation-state. From this discussion, we demonstrate how South Koreans internalized English in their everyday language life, whereby Englishization became widely and deeply pervasive in South Korea, and functions as a synecdochic representation of South Koreans’ internalization of Americanism in their everyday life.

**Language policies of South Korea and articulation of the foreign**

After the Liberation, South Korea’s attempt to regulate the Korean language was to follow the ‘natural drift’ under the ‘doctrine of usage,’ meaning without governmental intervention. Its primary concern was a ‘Korean-only’ issue in relation to foreign languages (particularly Chinese) (Ko, 1999). The first attempt to standardize the Korean language (across what later became North and South) was made during the colonial period. A ‘Draft for Unified Korean Spelling System’ was developed in 1933, with the principle of ‘Standard Korean Language,’ defined as the ‘Seoul tongue used by the middle class today’ (Ko, 1994, p. 141). After 20 years of examination by various organizations and 55 years after the first spelling system, the Ministry of Education and Culture published South Korea’s first official spelling system, ‘Revised Korean Spelling System and Standard Phonetics,’ in 1988. The notion of a standard language was also modified to the ‘contemporary Seoul tongue popularly used by the refined people’ (Ko, 1994, p. 26). It was not until 1991 that the National Korean Research Institute was formed under the Ministry of Culture as the first
government organization that systematically researched the issues underlying the development of the Korean language.

The biggest challenge the South Korean linguistic policies faced, under the ‘Korean refinement movement,’ was to deal with Chinese-origin words in the Korean language, as those Chinese-origin words comprise 70% of Korean words (Ko, 1999). In other words, from Ko’s (1999) perspective, the history of South Korean linguistic policies is, in short, the history of confrontation between ‘Korean-only’ and ‘Korean-Chinese mix use’ policies. The ‘mix-use’ of Korean and Chinese languages refers to ‘intrasentential switching’ (Thomason, 2001, p. 132) or, more precisely, code-mixing, using two or more languages within a single sentence in everyday use of Korean language. The ‘Korean-only’ movement originally began during the colonial period and was actively advanced by Korean scholars after the Liberation, and legalized by the South Korean government in 1948: the ‘Official document of Republic of Korea uses Korean-only. But, for the moment of necessity, it can jointly use Chinese’ (Ko, 1999, p. 10). However, as Ko (1999) illustrates, the ‘joint use’ practically meant ‘mixed use’ (i.e. code-mixing) and ‘Korean-only’ was only effective in educational spheres. Even when the South Korean government further advocated ‘Korean-only’ in government documentation, the policy was only recommended for the press agencies and publication agencies (Ko, 1999). And, in South Korea, the first Korean-only national newspaper came only in 1988. What is important in this picture of South Korean linguistic policies (with the ‘Korean refinement movement’ and ‘Korean-only’ policy) is that the ‘Korean-only’ policy applied primarily to Chinese-origin words, not other foreign-origin words (e.g. English). Left invisible and untouched, the logical consequence is the ‘over-use’ of English in the everyday life in South Korea (Hong, 2000).

From the perspective of political history, the ‘Korean only’ policy that attempted to depart from the Chinese legacy, while actively embracing and internalizing English, is a paradigmatic or synecdochic example of South Korea’s struggle to navigate itself out of the power dynamics and to face its historical challenges as a modern postcolonial nation-state. Simply, the Chinese language was no longer the cultural capital in the new era of an Americanized world.

There are sufficient numbers of examples regarding South Korean integration of English loan words, adapting them to the Korean phonological system (e.g. accessory, balcony, bell, bulldozer, curtain, diving, fuse, helicopter, ice cream, knock, K.O., mammoth, mannequin, mask, mosaic, musical, pastel, perm, pin, poster, rotary, spray, stocking, switch, trailer, etc.) (Choi, 2000; Hong, 2000; Huh, 2000; Park, 2000a, 2000b). In other words, the equivalent South Korean language for the above English loan words is used within a sound system, by adapting them into the Korean phonological system, rather than within a meaning system, by substituting them with new Korean words. What is interesting here is the equivalent North Korean language for the above English words is used as a meaning system (i.e. by substituting them with Korean words, often through loan translation) that incorporates the meaning of English words without any resonance with the original sound of English loan words. Table 1 illustrates the difference of South and North Korean incorporation of English loan words (each bracket provides the pronunciation of the word, and each parenthesis captures the meaning of each word).
The ‘over-use’ of English loan words in everyday language in South Korea becomes more visible when we trace different linguistic policies on the foreign language employed in North Korea. Whereas the Korean language use in South Korea ‘drifted naturally’ without much governmental intervention, North Korean linguistic policies had much clearer and stricter governmental policies and guidelines. Based on the ‘Ju-Che Ideology’ (North Korean National Marxist ideology emphasizing independence and self-empowerment), the North Korean government took a strong leadership stance in normalizing the Korean language (Hong, 2000). North Korea also adopted the 1933 ‘Draft for Unified Korean Spelling System.’ Then, in 1949, immediately after its inauguration, the North Korean government declared the ‘Korean use’ policy with complete disuse of Chinese words which aimed to dispel illiteracy and in doing so, to socialize people (Hong, 2000). In 1948, through educational reform, North Korea placed its central emphasis on the Korean language, whereas, interestingly, the South Korean educational system centrally emphasized

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English education (Ko, 1999). In 1964 and 1966, through the North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung’s instructions on language and the ‘Ju-Che Ideology,’ North Korea took a completely different turn in linguistic policies and proposed the ‘cultural language’ that stimulates a revolutionary language style, instead of a reliance on a ‘standard language’ (Park, 2000b). Therefore, the rationale for the ‘cultural language’ was to develop ‘our’ language, as ‘we’ should not follow other countries’ languages, including South Korean language that is mixed with English and Japanese; thus, only North Korean people, who are building a socialist society with the native language, can develop the normative Korean language, and that is why Pyongyang, the capital city of North Korea, must be the base of a new ‘cultural language’ (Ko, 1999). From this rationale, North Korean scholars criticized the South Korean language on the following logic: (1) because of US imperialism, South Korean language stopped its progress and lost its sovereignty; (2) there were too many negative words that reflected outmoded society and particularly, South Korean language was spoiled by too much use of English; and (3) South Korean linguistics was not developed scientifically but infected by toadyism and nihilism like any other South Korean public sphere (Ko, 1999). Here, again, we find the influence of a negative version of Occidentalism that views the West/America as a source of evil. We also find a resonance with East Asian Social Darwinism as ‘self-empowerment’ as it becomes the only way for ‘our’ survival in the jungle of militant global empires.

Unsurprisingly, owing to the different social structures and linguistic policies, other foreign languages had different fates in South and North Korea. If the English language is more commonly incorporated in South Korean language use through ‘code-mixing,’ there are more Russian words present in North Korean language use (Huh, 2000; Park, 2000b). In short, the biggest difference between South and North Korean language is the ‘over-use’ of English in South Korean and the ‘over-politicization’ of North Korean (Hong, 2000). South and North Korea’s struggles over foreign languages (e.g. English) symbolically illustrate how they navigated through their formation of nation-states vis-à-vis neighboring superpowers, and reflect much deeper sociohistorical changes and cultural-political challenges experienced by South and North Korea. In the South Korean example, the ‘over-use’ of English synecdochically illustrates the pervasiveness of Americanism as influenced by the dominant political and economic power of the USA, and justified by the Right-wing, conservative ideology of ‘the American rule as the survival of the fittest.’

Conclusion

In this paper we have provided a critical historical account of South Korea’s active pursuit of modernization and Westernization through Americanization, underpinned by East Asian Social Darwinism and manifested in the internalization of English in South Korean everyday language. South Korean linguistic policies on foreign languages, especially internalizing English loan words into Korean, coincide with South Korea’s struggle to face its historical changes and challenges. The process of language contact, incorporating English loan words into Korean, describes the interaction, or the meeting point, between a local and a foreign linguistic system and between particular Korean sociohistorical conditions and the universal/global expansion of American modernity. At this meeting point, two systems (linguistic and social) clashed, accommodated, and/or transformed each other. At the linguistic level, South Korean linguistic policies actively accommodated and internalized
English loan words in their everyday life, without much intervention or transformation, often by using Korean language as a phonological system for the original English words. On the other hand, North Korean linguistic policies manifest a different kind of active accommodation or rejection of English, by transforming English words into their own more familiar everyday North Korean words through loan translation. At the sociohistorical level, South Korea actively pursued and internalized Americanism (and East Asian Social Darwinism), as symbolic capital to master its historical challenges. In this process, the fluency of English is a symbolic indicator of its mastery.

South Korean President Lee’s ‘English Immersion Policy’ proposal took the ‘over-use’ of English to the next level – to teach every high school class in English. Now, one (linguistic and social) system is encouraged, or supposed, to take over the other – rather than interact, dialogue, and accommodate each other. Perhaps, one may read South Korea’s English drive more empathetically, to explain South Korea’s ‘competitiveness’ and ‘success’ in the global market; South Korea’s 2007 Gross Domestic Product was 969,795 million dollars and is ranked as the 14th in the world (World Bank, April 2009). However, our point is that Lee’s policy comes with a price. Already there are serious pathological problems caused by the ‘collective neurosis of English fever’ (Kim, 2002, p. 56) at the social and individual levels: a Los Angeles Times article (Demick, 2002) reports that some Korean parents force their children to go through a frenectomy, a tongue-surgery for a longer and more flexible tongue which is supposed to pronounce English words more fluently. Further, the deeper problem with the ‘English Immersion Policy’ is its ideological and discursive assumptions – uncritical and unquestioning of doxic knowledge of Americanism and East Asian Social Darwinism (i.e. the world is a battlefield; to survive, we have to empower ourselves by mastering the Western/American master’s tools). Consequently, Americanism and East Asian Social Darwinism justify and naturalize the ruler’s rhetoric and unequal relationship between the West and the East in general, and the USA and South Korea in particular. Clearly, Lee’s policy will neither question nor challenge the unequal status quo.

Interestingly, however, a desire to challenge the status quo was recently expressed by a leader of the Euro-American power blocks. After the 2009 G-20 London Summit, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown declared ‘the Washington consensus is over’ (Weisman & MacDonald, 2009). Collectively and officially, the leaders of the world acknowledged that the world needed more than the ‘law of the jungle’ and, unofficially, pronounced the decline of an unbridled American world order. It seems that we live in a time to witness both the peak and the fall of Americanism, and this requires of us a new practice/logic of equivalence to build a world that is more just, ethical, and democratic. About two weeks before, Prime Minister Gordon Brown again declared ‘the end of Washington Consensus and laissez-faire,’ and argued that ‘only progressive, centre-left governments can address the problems of the global change’ (Wintour & Watt, 2009). In South Korea, the social base for progressive politics has been significantly undermined. Historically, with the victory of Right-Wing, conservative politics, the discourse of radical (socialist, Marxist, anarchist) politics and Leftist internationalism was further marginalized. To rebuild the foundation for radical politics, we must start questioning ‘what is taken-for-granted’ and re-engaging with what has been marginalized:
Criticism (and radical criticism) is absolutely indispensable for any transformation as soon as one can no longer think things as one formerly thought them, transformation becomes both very urgent, very difficult, and quite possible. In fact I think the work of deep transformation can only be carried out in a free atmosphere, one constantly agitated by a permanent criticism. (Foucault, 1988, p. 155)

This questioning of the relationship between Korean and English, and Korea and the USA, will ultimately invite us to rethink the logic of equivalence between local and global, particular and universal, and Self and Other. The new logic of equivalence, however, must not be a reversal of the hierarchy, as Chen (1998) warns: so long as the colonized subjects’ prime reference is the colonizer, they remain passive, reactive, and imposed vis-à-vis the colonizer, and the political epistemology of decolonization remains ‘trapped in colonial history’ (p. 20). Chen argues that to break away from the frame of colonial identification, kept within the vicious cycle of colonization, decolonization, and recolonization, a decolonization movement has to move on, actively searching out multiple objects of identification. Therefore, from Chen’s view, a new cultural imaginary in decolonization movements that goes beyond a reversal of hierarchy is needed: ‘Recognition of differences, erasing the hierarchical structure of differences, and interiorizing differences are the principle of its political ethics. To put it simply, decolonization is a permanent struggle against any form of domination’ (p. 22). In short, new relations with others (McKerrow, 2001) and deep transformation (Foucault, 1988) are led by self-reflexive ‘permanent criticism’ (McKerrow, 1989, p. 96). Reflexivity is key in engaging in a recursive critique that recognizes that rhetorical claims, such as those by President Lee, are not impervious to change. Rebuilding a new South Korean identity as ‘Korean first–English second’ reclaims its national heritage, thereby reinforcing its cultural capital as a modern nation-state. At the same time, it also answers the critique from its northern neighbor with respect to the ‘proper’ way to use language. Language can insulate and isolate, as it may in North Korea. To disown English entirely is not a means to decolonization – to place it in context and employ it as appropriate to the conduct of international affairs may well lessen the bonds of a dominant ‘English first’ ideology while retaining that which is useful. As an educational goal, knowing English remains a value-added commodity for South Korean nationals; retaining their own Koreanness through the ever-evolving nature of their native language is equally critical. As we reach our conclusion, let us finish our discussion with a sense of optimism, with a sense of history:

History serves to show how that-which-is has not always been; i.e. that the things which seem most evident to us are always formed in the confluence of encounters and chances, during the course of a precarious and fragile history. It means that they reside on a base of human practice and human history; and that since these things have been made, they can be unmade, as long as we know how it was that they were made. (Foucault, 1988, p. 37)

Notes
1. However, Charles Darwin’s evolutionary theory and the logic of natural selection do not necessarily indicate its applicability to social theories. Therefore, we call him, along with Malthus, Kirby, Spencer, and Sumner, one of the ‘original architects’ of Social Darwinism.
2. For example, Park (2005) explains that in the case of Japan, East Asian Social Darwinism had been popular only between the 1880s and 1900s, but then was replaced by Shintoism that emphasized Emperor’s absolute divine power over citizens (pp. 80–81).
3. In our earlier discussion of different policies toward postcolonial power groups in South and North Korea, we argued that the pre-modern landed class in South Korea remained in their power position through collaboration with Japanese imperial force and later by pledging their loyalty to ‘Americanism and anti-communism.’ From the perspective of North Korea, there is a critical correlation between remaining Japanese loan words and Japanese power groups in South Korea.

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References


